In this paper, we propose a new practical identity-based encryption scheme which is suitable for wireless sensor network (WSN). We call it Receiver-Bounded Online/Offline Identity-based Encryption (RB-OOIBE). It splits the encryption process into two parts -the offline and the online part. In the offline part, all heavy computations are done without the knowledge of the receiver's identity and the plaintext message. In the online stage, only light computations such as modular operation and symmetric key encryption are required, together with the receiver's identity and the plaintext message. Moreover, since each offline ciphertext can be re-used for the same receiver, the number of offline ciphertexts the encrypter holds only confines the number of receivers instead of the number of messages to be encrypted. In this way, a sensor node (with limited computation power and limited storage) in WSN can send encrypted data easily: A few offline ciphertexts can be computed in the manufacturing stage while the online part is light enough for the sensor to process.
INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a wireless network composed of a large number of sensor nodes. In WSNs the scarcest resource is energy. For this reason, algorithmic research in WSN mostly focuses on the study and design of energy aware algorithms for data computation. This problem becomes harder in the case of security, as most of the security algorithms are quite heavy. Although symmetric cryptography maybe one of the approaches to solve the problem due to their small computation requirement, key distribution matter becomes another side effect. Recently, researchers are trying to apply assymmetric cryptography into WSN environment. Solutions include using online/offline algorithms and stateful public key encryption schemes.
Online/Offline algorithm. "Online/offline" cryptographic algorithm was first introduced by Even et al. [5] , in the context of digital signature. Under this paradigm, the signing process can be divided into two phases. The first phase is called offline phase which is executed prior to the arrival of a message and the second phase is called online phase which is performed after knowing the message. The online phase should be very fast and require only very light computation, such as integer multiplication or hashing. Other heavier computation such as exponentiation should be avoided in the online phase. This is the basic characteristic of online/offline schemes. In this way, online/offline schemes are particularly useful for low-power devices such as smartcard or wireless sensor applications. Those heavy computations are done in the offline phase which can be carried out by other powerful devices, or even pre-computed by the manufacturers in the setup stage.
The first online/offline encryption scheme was proposed by Guo, Mu and Chen [6] . However, it may not be practical enough to be used in WSN. As the offline information cannot be re-used, to encrypt every message one needs to execute the offline encryption process once. For example, if a sensor node needs to send 1000 encrypted data to the base station during its lifetime, it needs to store 1000 pieces of offline information first. Due to limited storage capacity inside a sensor node, it may not be practical. We call such encryption as message-bounded online/offline encryption (or OOIBE for short).
Stateful Public key Encryption. Bellare et al. [1] proposed a method to significantly speed-up the public key encryption (PKE) by simply allowing a sender to maintain a "state" that is re-used across different encryptions. This new type of PKE is called stateful PKE. This can greatly reduce the computation cost for the sender if it wants to encrypt messages many times. Moreover, if the sender stores some more information with respect to the receiver's public key, it may not need any more exponential computation for encrypting to this receiver. As an efficient construction, Bellare et al. presented a stateful PKE scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman assumption. Stateful encryption can be used in WSNs to reduce the computation cost of sensor nodes, compared with normal public key encryption.
Although stateful public key encryption reduces the computation cost a lot, the encrypter still needs to perform heavy computation at least once for each receiver. That limits the flexibility of its usage. In WSN environment, sometimes a sensor node may need to send data to different recipients, say, different base stations. Thus stateful public key encryption is not yet a perfect solution.
Identity-Based Cryptosystem. Identity-Based (ID-Based) Cryptosystem, introduced by Shamir [9] , eliminates the necessity for checking the validity of certificates in traditional public key infrastructure (PKI).
Both two message-bounded online/offline encryption schemes proposed by [6] are in identity-based setting. The first scheme requires 7 pairing operations in the decryption stage. It is proven secure in the selective-ID model. While for the second scheme, it is secure in the full security model, though the ciphertext is very large (more than 4700 bits). Recently Liu and Zhou [7] proposed another efficient OOIBE scheme. The ciphertext is just 1248 bits. However, their scheme can be only proven secure in the random oracle model. For stateful public key encryption, there is only one identity-based solution [8] which is also proven secure in the random oracle model only.
Receiver-Bounded Online/Offline IdentityBased Encryption
Receiver-Bounded Online/Offline Identity-Based Encryption (RB-OOIBE) is a practical encryption solution on wireless sensor nodes. It allows a sensor node to encrypt data with low computation power and low precomputation storage. Briefly, the data sender prepares a small number of offline ciphertexts first, say, n. Since computing offline ciphertexts doesn't require the receiver's identity, it can be executed in the manufacturing stage. Then the data sender can enjoy light encryption process on unlimited messages for up to n receivers. In other words, as long as there are less than n receivers, the data sender can avoid all heavy computations.
RB-OOIBE gets rid of the shortcomings of online/offline and stateful encryption. Unlike message-bounded online/offline encryption, it doesn't need to prepare a large amount of offline ciphertexts (one for each encryption). An offline ciphertext is dedicated to a receiver instead of a message to be encrypted. Unlike stateful encryption, the sender of RB-OOIBE doesn't need any heavy computation when he encrypts messages for up to n different receivers. Compared with hybrid cryptosystems. A hybrid cryptosystem consists of a public key (or identity-based) cryptosystem and a symmetric key cryptosystem. The sender first encrypts a symmetric key using the receiver's public key (or identity) and sends it to the receiver so that they can communicate with each other via the symmetric key cryptosystem. We can see that using hybrid cryptosystems, the sender has to perform a full public key encryption procedure before communicating to each receiver. Moreover, the receiver is not stateless -it has to keep a key for each sender. Therefore, hybrid cryptosystems are not suitable for a large scale network where 1) a low-power device has to send data to multiple recipients; 2) a stateless device has to receive data from many other parties.
Contribution
In this paper, we propose a new notion of Receiver-Bounded Online/Offline Identity-Based Encryption (RB-OOIBE). We provide an efficient construction which can be proven selective-ID CCA secure in the standard model. The advantage of our schemes over previous OOIBE schemes is very clear if a sender sends multiple messages to one recipient. Our scheme re-uses most of the previous information including the offline pre-computed data. Only a small offline ciphertext has to be stored on the sensor node. In contrast, other OOIBE schemes require a number of offline information which is proportional to the number of messages to be encrypted. The difference is significant if there are lots of messages to be sent by a sender.
Even for encrypting one message, our scheme is more efficient than all OOIBE schemes in the literature. There were only three schemes proposed: two of them were proposed by Guo, Mu and Chen in [6] . We use GMC-1 and GMC-2 to denote them respectively. The remaining scheme was proposed by Liu and Zhou [7] . We use LZ to denote it. When compared to GMC-1 (selective-ID security) and GMC-2 (full security), our scheme enjoys over 50% improvement in storage cost and ciphertext size. Even if we compare our schemes with LZ (which is proven secure only in the random oracle model), our scheme also gains efficiency improvement in storage cost and online computation cost.
Note that we don't need to care about selective-ID security here. Usually, there are at most hundreds of base stations in a wireless sensor network. That means we only need hundreds of identities in the system. The simulator can guess the attacking identity in advance, and this will not loosen the security reduction too much in practice.
DEFINITION
In this section we briefly describe the assumptions and definitions of our construction.
Bilinear Group
Let G and GT be two cyclic groups of prime order p. Let e : G × G → GT be a map with the following properties:
• Bilinear: for all g1, g2 ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z, e(g , g2) ab .
• Non-degenerate: for some g ∈ G, e(g, g) ̸ = 1.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operations in G and GT , and the bilinear map are efficiently computable.
Complexity Assumption
Our construction is based on the decision Bilinear DiffieHellman (BDH) assumption [4, 2] . the decision BDH problem in G is that given a tuple g, g a , g b , g c ∈ G and an element Z ∈ GT , decide if Z = e (g, g) abc .
Definition 1. The decision BDH assumption holds in G if no polynomial time algorithm A has non-negligible advantage in solving the Decisional BDH problem. More precisely, we define the advantage of A in distinguishing two distributions as
where R ∈R GT and the size of group G depends on the security parameter λ. The decision BDH assumption holds in G if Adv
A,G (λ)} is negligible for any adversary A.
CONSTRUCTION
We introduce our main scheme Π in this section. The scheme is based on Boneh and Boyen's IBE [2] . Note that the offline encryption should be performed by powerful devices in the offline phase. In the online phase, one can arbitrarily choose a pre-computed offline ciphertext from the state table and employ it in the online encryption. One offline ciphertext can be dedicated to one recipient only. The encrypter should maintain the state table for recording the usage of offline ciphertexts.
• Setup(1 λ ). Randomly generate a prime p, two groups G, GT of order p, a bilinear map e and generators g, g2, h1, h2 ∈ G. Compute g1 = g α where α ∈R Zp.
Choose a key derivation function D : GT → {0, 1}
k , where k is the block size of a symmetric key encryption SE=(SEnc,SDec), and a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Zp. Output the public parameter and master secret key:
• KeyGen(param, M K, id). Pick a random value r ∈ Zp. Compute the secret key for id as
• Off-Encrypt(param, st). Randomly choose s,â,b,ĉ ∈R Zp and compute
and
• On-Encrypt(param, id, m, st). Get C ′ from the entry (id, C ′ ) ∈ st. If there exists no such C ′ , randomly pick an entry ( * , C ′ ) from st and replace it with (id, C ′ ). If there is no free entry ( * ,
where σ = H (c2, c3, c4, c5, t1) . Output the final ciphertext
and the updated state table st.
• Decrypt(P aram, sk id , C). Let C = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, t1, t2 ) and sk id = (d1, d2). Compute σ = H(c2, c3, c4, c5, t1) .
Check that e(c4c
If the equation holds, output '⊥'. Otherwise, compute c1 = e(c2, d1)/e(c3c
The scheme is proved IND-sID-CCA secure. We omit the proof in this version. Theorem 1. Our scheme Π is IND-sID-CCA-secure assuming the decision BDH assumption holds in G, the symmetric encryption scheme SE=(SEnc,SDec) with block size k is IND-CCA secure, the hash function H is collision-resistant and the key derivation function D : GT → {0, 1} k is secure. More precisely, we have
where λ is the security parameter and qD is the maximum number of queries to the decryption oracle.
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
There are only 3 existing online/offline IBE schemes, two of them are proposed by Guo, Mu and Chen in [6] and one of them is proposed by Liu and Zhou [7] . We use GMC-1, GMC-2 and LZ to denote them respectively. We also assume that |G| = 160 bits, |q| = 160 bits, |GT | = 1024 bits and message space is 128 bits for the following comparison. Assume AES is used for the symmetric key encryption, where both the key size and ciphertext size are 128 bits. In order to make it CCA secure, we use another MAC function which adds further 80 bits to the ciphertext. For the online/offline signature scheme used in GMC-1, we adopt Boneh and Boyen's [3] construction which requires 320-bit offline, 320-bit online signatures and 320-bit public/private keys (by assuming some group elements can be shared between different keys). Table 1 shows the comparison between our scheme and other OOIBE schemes, in the case of encrypting one single message. The differences can be summarized as follow:
1. When compared to the scheme in the full security model (GMC-2), both the offline storage and ciphertext size of our scheme are 4 times smaller than GMC-2. Again, as described before, selective-ID security is not really weak in our scenario. 2. When compared to the scheme in selective-ID model (GMC-1), both the offline storage and ciphertext size of our scheme are 2 times smaller than GMC-1. Even if we compare to the random oracle scheme (LZ), our scheme still achieves a smaller offline storage (2 times smaller).
3. In terms of computation requirement, we do not require any point addition operation (M operation) in the online encryption stage for both schemes. Modular computation (mc operation) and symmetric key encryption (SE operation) are much faster than M operation. Thus the online encryption stages of our scheme is faster than GMC-1 and GMC-2.
4. We also note that schemes in the random oracle are usually more efficient than those in the standard model, due to the weaken security level. However, our scheme achieves similar or even outstanding performance over the random oracle scheme (LZ).
Note that the offline computation and offline storage are independent of the number of messages to be encrypted in our scheme, the efficiency gain can be magnified when more messages will be sent. So when the number of receivers is limited, our schemes can achieve much better performance when compared to previous OOIBE schemes.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new scheme called ReceiverBounded Online/Offline ID-based Encryption. The efficiency improvements of our scheme over previous schemes are very clear, especially in the case that many messages are encrypted for one receiver. In general, a wireless sensor node has three main limitations: energy, computation power and storage. For energy saving, our scheme provides the shortest ciphertext length compared to other OOIBE schemes. By the online/offline property, the sensor node doesn't need any heavy computation for encryption. Most importantly, RB-OOIBE saves lots of space required for offline ciphertexts. This makes our scheme practical for wireless sensor nodes.
